Enforcement of CA-UCON Model by Almutairi, Abdulgader & Siewe, Francois
Journal of Electrical Engineering 3 (2015) 60-69
doi: 10.17265/2328-2223/2015.02.002
Enforcement of CA-UCON Model 
Abdulgader Almutairi1 and Francois Siewe2
1. Computer Science College, Al Qassim University, Burydah 51412, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
2. Software Technology Research Laboratory, Faculty of Technology, De Montfort University, Leicester, LEI 9BH, United Kingdom 
Abstract: A CA-UCON (Context-Aware Usage CONtrol) model is an extension of the traditional UCON (Usage CONtrol) model
which enables adaptation to environmental changes in the aim of preserving continuity of access. When the authorisations and
obligations requirements are met by the subject and the object, and the conditions requirements fail due to changes in the environment 
or the system context, CA-UCON model triggers specific actions to adapt to the new situation. Besides the data protection, CA-UCON 
model also enhances the quality of services, striving to keep explicit interactions with the user at a minimum. In this paper, we propose 
an architecture of the reference monitor for the CA-UCON model and investigate a variety of enforcement approaches in ubiquitous 
computing systems; whether centralised, distributed or hybrid; depending on applications. 
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1. Introduction
One of the most rapidly developing areas in ICT
(information and communications technology) is 
known as “ubiquitous computing”, first introduced by
Weiser [1]. It refers to the ever increasing phenomenon 
of integrating and embedding ICT tools in people’s 
daily lives and in the situations or environment in
which they live [2-4]. This has been made possible by
the ever improving developments in the manufacturing 
of microprocessors, which now have built-in
communication functions and other amenities. There
are many applications available for ubiquitous
computing, ranging from health-care, home-care, 
environmental monitoring, intelligent transport
systems management and monitoring, etc. In order to
function correctly, ubiquitous computing systems 
collect and share a great deal of information about the
users, their mobile devices and environment. Securing 
the use of this information is one of the most important
challenges in ubiquitous computing, paramount for the
widespread acceptance of such a technology. 
The CA-UCON (Context-Aware Usage CONtrol)
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model [5] is the latest major enhancement of the
traditional access control models which enables (i)
mutability of subject and object attributes; (ii)
continuity of control on usage of resources; and (iii) 
adaptation to environmental changes in the aim of 
preserving continuity of access despite changes in user
context. The concept of mutability refers to the fact that
attributes are not static but do change intermittently. 
Continuity of access decision ensures that decision to 
permit and allow access to an object is made constantly
before and during the access to an object. This access
decision is based on three key factors: authorisation,
obligation and condition requirements. When the 
authorisation and obligation requirements are met by 
the subject and the object, and the condition 
requirements fail due to changes in the environment or 
the system context, specific actions are automatically 
triggered to adapt to the new situation, so as to
minimise disruption to the users. These make
CA-UCON a suitable usage control model for
ubiquitous computing systems [5]. 
This paper addresses the enforcement of the
CA-UCON model in a ubiquitous computing
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(1) An architecture of the CA-UCON RM 
(CA-UCON Reference Monitor) is proposed (Section
3); its innovative features include context-awareness
and dynamic adaptation to changing environmental
situations;
(2) The deployment of CA-UCON RM is
investigated based on three different approaches:
centralised, distributed and hybrid; depending on
ubiquitous computing applications (Section 4).
2. Overview of CA-UCON Model 
A CA-UCON model is an extension of the
traditional UCON model [6] that enables adaptation to
environmental changes in the aim of preserving 
continuity of access. Indeed, when the authorisations
and obligations requirements are met by the subject and 
the object, and the conditions requirements fail due to
changes in the environmental or the system context,
CA-UCON model triggers specific actions to adapt to
the new situation. Besides the data protection,
CA-UCON model also enhances the quality of services, 
keeping explicit interactions with the user at a 
minimum.
The behaviour of the CA-UCON model can be
described using a FSM (finite state machine) depicting
how a subject’s request to access an object is handled
in the CA-UCON model. The FSM is shown in Fig. 1,
where nodes are called states and edges are called 
transitions. The initial state, labelled initial, 
corresponds to the state when the system is waiting for
a subject to submit a request. 
There are three final states: end, when the access has
successfully terminated; denied, when the access
request has been denied; and revoked, when access 
permission has been revoked during access and hence 
the access stopped. The intuitive meaning of the 
remaining states of the FSM can be summarised as 
follows: requesting, denotes when the access request is
being processed; accessing, represents the state when 
the actual access is taking place; preadapting, is the
state when the system is trying to adapt to the 
environmental context prior to access; and finally
onadapting, is when the system is trying to adapt to the
environmental context during access.
The transitions of the FSM are labelled with the
events (or actions) that fire them. The event tryaccess 
occurs when a subject sends an access request (e.g. by
clicking a menu button). This event forces the FSM to
enter the requesting state to process that access request.
While in this state, the system can perform updates on
the subject’s and object’s attributes through preupdate 
events. If the authorisations, obligations and conditions
Fig. 1 Execution of an access request in the CA-UCON model. 
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requirements are all met, the system emits the
permitaccess event and moves into the accessing state.
If for some reasons either the authorisations
requirement or the obligations requirement is not met, 
the system emits the event denyaccess and terminates
in the denied state.
However, if both the authorisations requirement and
obligations requirement are met, but the conditions 
requirement is not satisfied, the system emits the
preadaptaccess event and moves into the preadapting
state. In this state, specific adaptation actions, denoted
by the preadapt events, are performed in an attempt to 
meet the conditions requirement. If the adaptation is
successful, the permitaccess event is raised and the 
system transitions into the accessing state. In addition,
a new request to access a specified alternative object,
denoted by the tryaltaccess event, may be issued 
automatically by the system if the adaptation actions 
fail. Otherwise the access request is simply denied
when no adaptation is possible.
When access permission is granted (see
permitaccess event), the system transitions into the
accessing state in which the actual access takes place.
During access the system can perform updates on 
subject’s and object’s attributes via onupdate events. If 
during access either the authorisations requirement or 
the obligations requirement is not met, the system
emits the event revokeaccess and terminates in the
revoked state. However, if both the authorisations
requirement and obligations requirement are 
continuously met, but the conditions requirement fails,
the system raises the onadaptaccess event and moves 
into the onadapting state. In this state, specific 
adaptation actions, denoted by the onadapt events, are
performed in an attempt to meet the conditions 
requirement. If the adaptation is successful,
the continueaccess event is raised and the system
moves back into the accessing state. In the
effort to enhance the quality of service even further, the 
system might issue an implicit request to access a 
specified alternative object through the tryaltaccess
event, when the adaptation actions fail. In the worst
case when no adaptation is possible, the access 
permission is simply revoked and the access stopped at
once.
When an access terminates successfully via the
endaccess event, the system moves into the end state
and eventually performs updates on the subject’s and
object’s attributes through postupdate events. Further 
details of the model can be found in Ref. [5].
3. Architecture of CA-UCON Reference 
Monitor 
In this section, we propose an architecture of the
CA-UCON RM (CA-UCON reference monitor) as 
depicted in Fig. 2, where computing components are
represented in a rectangular shape, data storage in a
cylindrical shape, and arrows indicate interactions
between components. In the following subsections, we
explain in detail each component along with its role in
this architecture. 
3.1 Enforcement Point
The role of this component is to receive requests
from the subject that wishes to access an object and to
issue decision requests to the decision point
component—in particular to the UD (usage decision)
component—and to wait for the response from it,
whether PERMIT or DENY. It then lets the subject
access the service if the reply from decision point
component is PERMIT; otherwise, it denies access to
the subject. This behaviour is typical to many access
control models [7-9]. 
3.2 Decision Point
Unlike in other access control models [8-10], this
component consists of two parts, UD (usage decision)
component and AD (adaptation decision) component.
The responsibility of the UD component is the 
evaluation of each access request that receives from
enforcement point component. UD checks the 
authorization, obligation and condition requirements of 
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Fig. 2 Architecture of the CA-UCON reference monitor.
each request in order to permit or deny the access
request. To do so, UD communicates with the attribute
manager component in order to acquire the values of
the attributes of the subject, object and environment. If 
all the requirements are met, UD responds by PERMIT
to the enforcement point component to allow the access 
to take place.
However, if the authorization and obligation
requirements are met, but the condition requirement is
not fulfilled by the environment, UD communicates
with the AD component in order to adapt to the new
situation. AD interacts with the context information
manager component to identify the current context of 
the subject, object and environment. It then performs 
appropriate actions in an attempt to make the
environment meet the condition requirement. This
attempt will last for a specified period of time after 
which the adaptation will be deemed successful or 
unsuccessful. If successful, the access request will be
granted, otherwise it will be denied.
3.3 Attribute Manager 
The responsibility to this component is to provide
access to the database of subject and object attributes in 
order to use them in access decision. All subject and 
object attributes will be stored in a database and
updated as they change.
3.4 Context Information Manager
This component is responsible for monitoring and
evaluating the context information such as subject
context, object context and environment context. It
uses a variety of sensors to sense different types of 
contexts. It communicates with AD component in order
to provide the current context of the subject, object and
environment.
4. Enforcement Architecture of CA-UCON 
Model 
In this section, we present three different 
enforcement approaches in order to demonstrate how
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the CA-UCON model can be implemented in real
world situations. The CA-UCON model can be
enforced in a number of ways depending on the
application. These enforcement approaches are known 
as the centralized approach, the distributed approach
and the hybrid approach. The following subsection will
explain each approach in detail to show the difference
between these approaches, their usages, and possible
benefits and limitations.
4.1 Centralized Enforcement Architecture
A centralized architecture is dependent upon one 
node being designated as the computer node or server.
This node executes and runs the complete application 
locally and all users share this central system. Hence
control and failure are concentrated in a single place,
the server. The CA-UCON RM will be implemented in 
the server side only. This entails control of the services
being the responsibility of the server alone as depicted
in Fig. 3.
How does this model support adaptation? The server
is installed with a variety of sensors (physical and
logical) which are able to record the context and 
behaviour of the subjects, objects and environment.
The adaptation to the new situation and sending of the
appropriate service to the user will occur based on
these contexts and behaviours. Thus, adaptation
required for any service will be initiated by the server.
This is a strict method of enforcement since all controls
and adaptations are carried out centrally on the server
where CA-UCON RM is implemented.
The centralized architecture presents a number of 
benefits. Firstly, avoidance of duplication: a
centralised approach facilitates having a single version
of any information system for the entire organisation.
They also help to ensure that every piece of data is
stored only once. Secondly, sharing resources is easy 
since data are stored in a single place, accessible to all
legitimate users. This makes the system maintenance
and  (security)  administration  more efficient.  Central
Fig. 3 Centralised enforcement architecture.
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process and planning also permits well-suited 
technology and skills to be established. The sharing of
resources other than data is simplified. The transfer
between units of hardware, software and employees 
becomes easier. Finally, scale economies are attained,
since centralised approaches permit most activities to
be carried out with lower unit cost.
From amongst the disadvantages of the centralized
architecture is heavy time consumption, since carrying 
out actions and decisions centrally is additional time 
consuming than non-centralised approach. This is due 
to the extra time it takes to assemble information from
various different distributed places as input to
centralised system decisions. Furthermore, when the
central computer or database system fails, then the
system is inaccessible to anyone until the
server/database recovers. Additionally, rigidity and
increased dependence and susceptibility are inherent to
the centralized architecture.
Example 1: Suppose a ubiquitous learning
(u-learning) system that provides u-lectures in three
different formats: video, audio and text. The access to
each format is restricted by specific requirement on 
context of the user. If the user requests a u-lecture in
the video format when she/he is driving, the system 
will not deliver it to her/him in the video format, but it
will deliver it in the audio format which is suitable to
the user current context (driving). In the centralised
approach, the server may use a location tracking
technique to sense the context of the user (whether
driving or not) and then decide in what format the
u-lecture must be delivered.
4.2 Distributed Enforcement Architecture
The distributed architecture can be understood in
two distinct ways. It can be defined by the physical
components or defined from the angle of the user or
computation. These are known as the physical view 
and the logical view respectively. A distributed system
is a set of nodes (computers or portable devices)
connected by a communication network. The nodes in 
the network do not share their memory and are loosely 
coupled. The nodes in the system communicate via
passing messages over the communication network 
using communication protocols.
The logical model is the view that an application has
of the system. It includes a set of simultaneous
processes and communication routes between them. 
The centre network is treated as completely linked.
Communication of processes is done by transferring
messages to each other.
In either view, each node in the distributed system is 
responsible for its own security as depicted in Fig. 4.
The CA-UCON RM will be installed on each node
(device) which will be responsible for handling access
request in the manner described in Section 3. The
enforcement of distributed architecture exhibits a
number of benefits. Prominent amongst these is greater
compatibility between systems and local needs, since
users can develop their own information systems. 
These are more likely to correspond with their needs
than those developed by someone else. Another benefit 
is greater system usage, as users show increased 
motivation by such approaches and are thus more 
enthusiastic to adopt computing when it directly
bolsters their own interests, benefits and work. Finally,
it supports quicker system development, since the less
the organisational distance between system user and 
system developer, the swifter the development of that
system is likely to be.
On the other hand certain negatives are displayed.
This approach places barriers to sharing data.
Distributed approaches can produce information
systems in individual work units that are incompatible
with each other and asynchronous. Further, effort is 
duplicated, since units will often duplicate what others 
are doing. Therefore distributed approaches tend to be
very costly. Distribution can also lead to a failure to
achieve scale economies as activities are not pooled.
Example 2: Following up from Example 1, suppose
each u-lecture format requires some minimum amount
of free memory available on the user’s mobile device, 
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Fig. 4 Distributed enforcement architecture.
e.g.: 5 MB for a video, 2 MB for an audio, and 1MB for 
a text format. If a user requests a u-lecture in video 
format and the available memory on her/his mobile
device is less than 5 MB, the system needs to adapt to
this new situation. In a distributed enforcement
architecture where CA-UCON RM is installed on each 
mobile device, the adaptation can be done e.g. by
turning on a garbage collector software on the mobile 
device (client side). This will eventually increase the
size of available memory on the mobile device. If
enough memory has been freed and the current
available memory on the mobile device is greater than
5 MB, then the adaptation is successful and access will
be granted.
4.3 Hybrid Enforcement Architecture
Hybrid enforcement architecture is an interesting 
evolutionary architecture that has combined features of
centralised enforcement architecture and distributed 
enforcement architecture. The purpose is to circumvent
the disadvantages displayed by these architectures
whilst  maintaining  many  of their  advantages.  In this
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Fig. 5 Hybrid enforcement architecture.
architecture the CA-UCON RM is enforced in both the
client side and the server side as can be seen in Fig. 5.
Evaluation of the requested access right will take place
on the mobile device side or on the server side, or on
both. This enables the controlling of service or
adapting to a new situation to occur at any time 
anywhere without restrictions. Some requested service
accesses cannot be undertaken without adaptations
from both the server and client side. This is difficult to
do in the previously discussed architectures. On the
other hand, the hybrid approach facilitates the
implementation of the CA-UCON RM in the real world 
on both server and client sides, enabling more flexible
adaptations. Hybrid architecture is a comprehensive
and versatile approach. By combining two different
architectures, a third, more tailored architecture for the
enforcement of the CA-UCON RM has been evolved. 
Mobile devices and servers should be fitted with a
variety of sensors in order to monitor all contexts
related to the subject, object and environment. This is
done so as to adapt to new situations and deliver a
suitable service for the majority of contexts. 
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The advantages of the hybrid architecture include
reliability, because a fault detected in one part of the 
system can be isolated from the rest. Therefore the
necessary corrective measures can be carried out, 
without disturbing the operating of any other part of the
system. Furthermore, hybrid architecture displays
more flexibility than other architectures since it
integrates the benefits of both centralized and 
distributed architectures optimizing the existing
resources whilst avoiding many drawbacks. On the
other hand, the hybrid architecture involves a larger
scaleof work and therefore is normally more costly. 
Example 3: In the u-learning system described in
Examples 1 and 2 above, if the user requests a u-lecture
in video format when she/he is driving and the
available memory size in her/his mobile device is less
than 2 MB (i.e., 2 megabytes), the system in this case
needs to adapt to the new situation by performing 
actions on both sides (server side and client side). So,
in the server side the system has to deliver the audio
format instead of video format based on the user 
context which is in this case, driving. Meanwhile, the
system has to check the amount of free memory 
available on the mobile device prior to delivering the 
service, which in this case is less than 2 MB, i.e., lower
than the minimum memory size requirement for 
accessing a u-lecture in audio format. In this case the
client side (mobile device) has to adapt as well, e.g., by
executing a garbage collector software in order to free
more memory space. If both adaptation actions are
successful, then access will be granted; otherwise 
access will be denied. In this scenario, CA-UCON RM 
is installed on both the server and the user mobile
device (client). 
5. Related Work 
There have been some works conducted in term of 
usage control enforcement. In spite of the short period
of time from the time when the notion of usage control
was introduced, there are a lot of substantial efforts in
order to create an appropriate enforcement mechanism.
For instance, Sandhu et al. [11] proposed a new
approach known as a TRM (trusted reference monitor)
which is placed in client side in order to enforce 
policies. So, the protocol that is used between TRM
and application, as well as between different TRMs is
relied on challenge-response. Any access request from
receiver is followed by a challenge. The requester 
consequently confirms the application, platform or 
environment throughout the means of a digital
signature.
Another approach was proposed by Abie et al. [12]
which is similar strategy to the above approach, it is 
based on a hardware-based TPM (trusted platform 
module) in order to enforce usage policies on digital 
objects. It is known as SEOs (self-enforcing objects)
which is used as secure container for transferring 
objects and policies and also has the ability to enforce 
the attached policies on any trusted platform
autonomously. Moreover, a similar enforcement
approach was proposed by Nauman et al. [13] to
explain the notion of platform attestation. The system
ensures via a WS-Attestation procedure that receiving 
platform must act correctly before the information is 
released. HUE (hardware UCON engine) is another
enforcement approach proposed by Matson et al. [14] 
which is a different from the above mentioned
approaches. HUE is considered as secure co-processor
with a designated software stack in order to offer
integration with the operating system. Next, the
Right-Enforcer was proposed by Alam et al. [15] 
known as a product that is used to enforce simple usage
control restrictions, i.e., limiting the capability to view, 
copy, print and store. This approach is incorporated in
an e-mail user, so whenever a usage controlled object is
delivered to a receiver, the Right-Enforcer encrypts the
content and then sends the term of use to a centralised
Right-Server. Then the receiver is forced to use the
Right-Enforcer in order to be able to decrypt the 
content and so the policy is always enforced.
However, majority of these enforcement approaches 
have been done in usage control model (UCON). 
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Unlike the above UCON enforcement approaches,
CA-UCON model enables adaptation to environmental
changes in the aim of preserving continuity of access
by triggering specific actions to adapt to new situations.
In addition to data protection, CA-UCON model
enhances the quality of services, striving to keep
explicit interactions with the user at a minimum.
Therefore, the need for enforcement approach for an 
adaptive usage control such as CA-UCON to control
the service in ubiquitous environment is significant.
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have presented the architecture of
the CA-UCON RM and explained the responsibility for
each component and the interactions among them. We 
then, proposed three types of enforcement architectures
of CA-UCON model, namely: the centralised 
enforcement architecture, the distributed enforcement
architecture, and the hybrid enforcement architecture.
In future works, we will investigate actual
implementation of the proposed architectures in a
real-world ubiquitous computing application, such as a
u-learning system.
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